Anima and Animus: An Interpersonal View

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Prelude

This paper falls into two parts, the first theoretical, the second practical. This is because it is not clear that the anima and animus as described by Jung are primarily to be thought of as clinical concepts, although he certainly thought they have clinical implications. The practicing analyst has to make a distinction between a way of working with patients and the theory which underlies this way of working, even though while actually working, this distinction tends to disappear. It seems to me particularly important to make it when thinking about concepts, particularly when considering what place they may have in clinical practice. In my own thinking, I have found that it is much easier to be clear about what I think than about what I do. It is important to respond naturally rather than artificially to patients and only afterward can I really look at the theoretical basis of what I am doing. The words anima or animus may simply not cross my mind while with the patient but afterward I might realize that had they not


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been in the back of my mind, I would not have said or even thought what I did. So my theory in part one may seem relatively clear-cut, easier to argue against or agree with, than my clinical illustrations in part two. I do try to indicate how I think when I am with the patient but this may seem somewhat idiosyncratic until I try to apply concepts such as the anima and animus. I leave it to the reader to judge whether these concepts enhance or detract from my descriptions.

Part One: Some Theoretical Reflections

The Difficulties

The anima and animus are archetypes. They are also names for that part of any person which belongs more properly to the opposite gender. These two statements are not easily compatible. How can an archetype be a part of a person, even an unconscious part? This is the first question one must ask of Jung before one can consider how these concepts can be fruitfully used in clinical practice. This is not restricted to the anima and animus; it can be asked of all the archetypes described by Jung. But with anima and animus one has, in addition, to ask what is meant by gender. If nothing else divides Jungian practitioners, surely this will. It is no longer a question on which any two people can readily agree. On the other hand, Jung’s thinking lends itself readily to reinterpretation, partly due to the difficulty of his writing.

Nobody could call Jung easy to read. Some of the difficulty is due to his style and some to the complexity of his subject matter but there is, as well, a certain confusion in his thinking and his manner of reasoning. Particularly vexing is his way of making loose connections and associations which lead him to inconsistency and self-contradiction. Yet, on first acquaintance, many of his ideas seem quite simple and straightforward. In the “Two Essays” (Jung 1943), the definitions in Psychological Types (Jung 1921), and in his contribution to Man and His Symbols (Jung 1964), even in the Tavistock lectures (Jung 1935), he is relatively clear and simple. One may agree or disagree with what he says but not feel bewildered by what he is saying. In his more difficult texts, such as The Psychology of the Unconscious (Jung 1911–1912), particularly before its revision and republication as Symbols of Transformation (Jung 1952) or Psychology of the Transference (Jung 1946), one can rapidly find oneself bemused by the way these apparently simple ideas become so complicated, so ambiguous, and create so many contradictions that the reader is tempted to give up the concepts themselves. One might easily come to the conclusion that one was initially misled by the apparent simplicity of a concept which breaks down under Jung’s own scrutiny of it.

The anima and animus are prime examples of this problem. Nothing seems easier than to recognize that a man has an unconscious female part of himself which, because he disavows it, is liable to be projected, as some kind of female figure, onto women. A woman on whom he has projected this female figure might then become mysteriously fascinating to him, so that he might fall in love with her, or, if the anima takes a negative form, he might fear or reject or avoid or despise her until, perhaps with the help of analysis, he becomes sufficiently individuated to have integrated this female part and to take back the projections, so that he will then see the woman more as she truly is. He will then not only be more complete but better able to relate satisfactorily to women. It is easy, too, to grasp the idea that women have a similarly unconscious male part, with its own positive and negative features, which also requires integration. So far, so good. There are a hundred elementary accounts of Jung which give this apparently simple outline of his views. Even so, the reader might have a problem with the names Jung chooses for these parts and ask why the female part should be called “anima,” which means “soul,” and the male part “animus,” which means “spirit,” and a man might encounter some difficulty if he tries to hold a conversation with his anima, as Jung did.

Even this account, although easy to follow, will not easily satisfy the modern reader who knows that we cannot take for granted that we know what men and women really are, in the way that Jung assumes. The reader, even if she or he is not a feminist, is now fully aware that no easy generalization about what are now often pointedly called “women and men” can be made without putting at risk the author’s claim to impartiality. Can we even speak of feminine or masculine psychology in the way Jung did so freely?

Thus the very basis of the appeal to simplicity with which Jung started, that men and women, who were obviously not the same, must have basic differences in their psychologies, can no longer be assumed. This does not mean that the basis is untrue, and even if Jung’s ideas are thought to be the highly biased overgeneralizations of a typically chauvinistic man of his day, it may still be the case that there are, indeed, fixed characteristics which will always differentiate the psychologies of men and women, even if the differences are not exactly what Jung thought they were.

Unfortunately, the revolution in thinking about sex and gender has
been so rapid that, like all revolutions, it has produced some radical new solutions, some of which are discovered to be, in their turn, naive oversimplifications, which either propose new differences as stereotyped as the old or deny differences altogether. In either case, these new propositions can provide an easy target for a reactionary backlash. In the field of analytical psychology, they may provoke the demand for a return to orthodoxy, to the word of Jung as he inscribed it in his writings.

Orthodoxy has a positive aspect, too, in the wish to respect Jung or at least not to do violence to his genius, but this can be frustrated by a number of difficulties. The truly orthodox, the fundamentalists, will soon encounter Jung’s own unorthodoxy, his own rebellion toward his own attempt to simplify and to classify when his fertile imagination took over. Others who see this as a weakness in Jung and try to correct it may run into the danger of a different kind of violation. In their attempt to be good thinkers and to be clear, concise, and logical, they may destroy much of the work of Jung’s imagination which gave so much subtlety to his ideas as they developed.

Then there is the influence of particular schools of thought associated with regional differences in analysis and training, the insidious influence of a group effect, usually inspired by one or two leading figures. These, while paying homage to Jung, may introduce modifications that alter the emphasis or “flavor” of all his concepts. Such movements form subgroups in the Jungian community which may fight bitter battles.

Finally, each individual is free to differ from Jung as well as from his or her training group on any point of theory or practice without following up the consequences. Theories are like buildings: only certain bricks can be removed without the whole edifice collapsing.

In composing this paper, I found myself facing each of these problems and continually had to ask myself not only whether I still agreed with Jung but, at times, whether the extent of my disagreement constituted a sort of heresy. Even the most basic ideas, such as the archetypes or the collective unconscious, which might be considered cornerstones of the building, did not escape an agonizing scrutiny.

Contraseñaulity and the Impossibility of Objectivity

It will become apparent that, in one respect at least, I have remained orthodox. I continue to regard the anima and animus as being contradsexual archetypes. This is because even though I can see that both genders may share the same images of the archetype in its male or female form, it also seems clear to me that the anima refers to an image of women derived from a male view of women and femininity while the animus is derived from a feminine view of men and masculinity. In other words, although I take Jung’s descriptions as revealing a biased view of the opposite gender, I do not see how anyone can be totally unbiased in this respect and this bias reflects an irreducible restriction of viewpoint based on essential male-female differences. This irreducible problem is one that characterizes psychology as a study of people, in that we are always looking at ourselves. By dividing ourselves into groups, we may imagine we are looking at other people. Who are the most objective about women? Other women or men? Perhaps we can never get beyond a point of view and can never avoid bias.

When speaking of a view or viewpoint, I am using the visual modality as a figure of speech but I mean to include all the ways in which a man can experience femininity. I certainly do not mean to restrict this experience to observation. Pure observation, rather than participation, if such a thing were possible, would lead to pure fantasy, probably pervasively voyeuristic or psychopathic, rather than reaching the desired objectivity of science. It is in relating to girls and women and getting some idea of what it is like to be one that a man can develop the feminine potentiality in himself and thus develop a mature rather than primitive anima (and, of course, vice versa for women and the animus). If the bias resulting from each person remaining either a man or a woman is inescapable, however, this may not be wholly undesirable. The meeting of points of view is what makes dialogue possible. In fostering dialogue, the objective is not to be objective: men cannot be objective about women without treating them as objects, and to this, women will rightly object.

I shall come back to this point later and develop it. As I do, it should be borne in mind that although my subject is the anima and animus, the same considerations apply to all the archetypes. Although they are often said to be “personalized,” I prefer to regard them as embodied by persons and therefore not conceivable in the absence of persons. Knowing the archetypes by relating to them means, in practice, relating to persons who embody them. But before developing my own views, I should like to draw attention to the great division of opinion on the notions of anima and animus in the literature on analytical psychology, forming what could loosely be called revisionist and orthodox schools of thought.
Two Schools of Thought, Six Authors in Search of a Character

I shall take three well-known authors from each school, orthodox and revisionist, and draw attention to the kind of evidence they use to support their arguments. I can only give here the briefest summary of their views. My three revisionist authors are Whitmont, Hillman, and Samuels.

Whitmont (1969, Chapters 11, 12, and 13), basing his argument on empirical clinical observation, proposes that we often in analysis meet the moody woman who is anima-possessed as well as the opinionated man who is animus-possessed. He therefore does not question Jung's descriptions, which led Jung to posit the idea of anima and animus, but questions only whether they could be differentiated between men and women.

Hillman (1985) argues from his position as an archetypal psychologist that the archetypes are not parts of us and that, therefore, they cannot possibly be said to belong to us. Rather, they lie neither within nor without but they form us and all our ideas about them. He sees the archetypes within a framework of polytheism, rejecting the Judeo-Christian tradition much more thoroughly than Jung ever did. Anima and animus are for him archetypes with the status of a Greek god and goddess so that anima, like soul or psyche, can be talked of as "she" rather than "it" and used without the definite article. His rejection of contrasexuality is logical and consistent with his overall picture of a revisioned psychology.

Samuels (1989), who belongs to a younger generation of Jungians or, as he would say, post-Jungians, takes a more extreme position. Reviewing the evidence, he concludes that there is no such thing as a feminine principle. His evidence is not confined to a study of the nature of the psyche but to a consideration of whether the anatomical and physiological differences between men and women need form the basis of thinking of characteristically feminine or masculine psychology. His questioning of feminine psychology is consistent with his questioning whether there is a specifically Jewish psychology. The argument, difficult to prove or to refute, is that there are no innate differences in the psychology of any group of individuals and that whatever differences might be found are attributable to culture, with the important consequence that they can be modified.

All three of these views are unorthodox in that they have in common a rejection of the contrasexuality of the anima and animus but retain Jung's idea that they are archetypes. Each must be taken up in the light of the evidence they provide, which is of three different kinds: clinical observation in the case of Whitmont, mythological reflection for Hillman, and biological study for Samuels. I have taken these three simply as three among many views that can be called dissident.

A detailed discussion of the positions taken up by these three authors is not in place here, but I should like, at this point, to say that although I find much that is persuasive in the arguments of all three I am not finally convinced by their evidence that we should make a fundamental change from Jung's views that each requires. Although their revisions are consonant with the widespread reevaluation of the way men and women see themselves, I see this reevaluation better expressed in the view that there are specifically different male and female psychologies, that is to say, that men and women are constitutionally profoundly different psychologically, even though Jung's idea of what these differences are need to be reconsidered. His own descriptions now sometimes seem stereotyped to the point of caricature.

I should now like to cite briefly three authors who espouse a more orthodox viewpoint on contrasexuality. Again, my choice out of so many is somewhat arbitrary, but each is one who has impressed me deeply.

The first is Grinell (1973), an eminently orthodox Zurich analyst with an extraordinary grasp of alchemical symbolism. His book appeared as recently as 1971. Although he dwells on the alchemical phenomenology of male and female figures, he has no hesitation when discussing their clinical application, in speaking of "feminine psychology," meaning the true nature of his female patients, how much they may appear to have departed from it.

Penelope Shuttle and Peter Redgrove (1986) base the idea of feminine psychology very firmly on biological differences. Women, having periods, understand periodicity in a way that men cannot. Women therefore need to have male projections, for example the experience of the menstrual cycle, to the cyclical nature of birth and death than men can.

The third is Dunne (1989) who, approaching the same quest through her own dream as well as through theology, reaches similar conclusions. She draws on myth a great deal for her evidence, particularly on the myths of Semele, Eros and Psyche, and Beauty and the Beast, which she sees as variants of the same myth. She makes it clear that these myths are not just patterns of archetypal imagery com
from the collective unconscious but that they are expressions of the real differences between male and female psychology which are dependent on their bodily differences.

Again, we have here three outstanding examples of writers who draw their evidence respectively from clinical observation, biology, and mythology. Again, any evaluation of their work properly requires confirmation or denial based on a study of the evidence they offer. Each, from a particular perspective, is arguing for contrasexuality as Jung did.

As can be seen, all six of these authors, whether orthodox or not, have added something to Jung from their own fields of knowledge. Unfortunately, although each argues persuasively from a specialized standpoint, they do not reach the same conclusion and the controversy is not settled. My own position may turn out to be equally controversial. However, my wish to add my own voice to that of so many others in this debate is based on three considerations that I think are inherent in Jung's writings but are often overlooked. These three can be placed in a logical sequence as follows:

1) Man is essentially a self-defining animal. He can virtually be whatever he wants to be. Therefore, psychology always has to be based on a group definition of Man. As for Man, so for Woman. This hardly needs saying but saying it brings out the problem that there are these two great subgroups and that they are not, in all respects, the same.

2) No science is possible without making generalizations, and in psychology, to generalize about Man is to set limits on the plasticity of self-definition implied in (1).

3) To avoid contradiction between the above two observations, a hierarchic order of presentation is required, e.g., Human-kind, with Man and Woman as subgroups where there are also larger and smaller subgroups, as well as the individual person, have to be placed in a serial order of priority, which cannot be done without an implied system of values.

**Self-Definition and Its Limits**

John Shotter, in his *Images of Man in Psychological Research* (1975), argues that how psychologists behave should be more clearly linked with the way Man is defined and stresses the enormous plasticity that is possible in definition. As a kind of guiding myth, he uses Pico della Mirandola who, in a way that might seem extreme to our modern thinking, sees Man as having no "natural" nature. In Pico's creation myth, God had more or less created the universe but then had the problem of wanting to create Man because He "desired that there should be someone to reckon up the reason for such a big work, to love its beauty and to wonder at its greatness" (Shotter 1975, p. 12). The problem was that he had nowhere to put him and, interestingly from our point of view, "there was nothing in his archetypes from which he could mould him" (ibid.). He therefore decided to place him in the midpoint of the world and leave to him to mould himself and choose whether to go upwards or downwards. So God says to Man: "Thou... art the moulder and maker of thyself; thou mayst sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou mayst prefer. Thou canst grow downwards into the lower natures which are brutes. Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul's reason into higher natures which are divine."

This humanistic picture of Man at the center, with the archetypes already used up, so to speak, of Man capable of infinite transformation but subject to a preexisting order, a hierarchically ordered arrangement in which "higher" = divine and "lower" = brutes, is similar to Jung's picture of Man as a sort of individuating animal. But Jung, no more than Pico, meant the myth to be taken literally. The transformation required imagination, which for Jung needed to be active, but imagination is required only if there are limits to what can be realized without it. One of these limits, or constraints, lies in our biology, our "animal nature." Another lies in such matters as our race, our age (or stage of life), and, most importantly for our present preoccupation, our gender. Here biology does seem to play a decisive, although as yet not clearly understood, part.

**Biological Basis for Sex Differences**

There is a substantial and growing body of evidence supporting the notion that there is no easy division to be made between sex and gender. Such a division is commonly made by feminists. In its extreme form, sex differences are thought to be confined to a few indisputable physical differences, such as the presence of the primary and secondary anatomical and physiological features of the grossest kind: penis or vagina, distribution of body fat and body hair, etc., and none of the differences listed under "sex" are thought to be responsible for gender. These are considered to be entirely the manifestations of cultural expectations. I think this point of view is similar to that espoused by dynamic psychiatry when it wishes to dispute "organic" or "genetic" explanations.
for mental illness. Analysts tend to overargue the case for environmental origins because what is caused by the environment can be more easily changed by the environment in the form of analysis (although Jung himself believed that a toxin was responsible for schizophrenia). Now it is true that there is an enormous amount of prejudice about the sexes and perhaps most of the commonly held views on the differences between them are the result of culturally bound stereotypes. But not all. We should look carefully at both sides of the debate. We should beware of lowering the level of argument to a battle between those who say it’s all in our genes and those who say it’s all due to culture. Culture is at least in part the expression of our biology and also constrains our attempts to liberate ourselves from it. We are unique among the animals in our development of culture but this can be seen as a very slow evolutionary development of our species, as animals competing for survival. We know also that genes do not exert the influence only at the beginning of life, with the environment then taking over, but that there is a continuous interchange between the two throughout life.

Males differ genetically from females through the presence of the Y chromosome, which like the penis, women do not have. It is in the early stage of fetal development that the Y chromosome brings about the production of testosterone, which brings the distinctively male primary and sexual characteristics and their changes throughout the life cycle, producing differences of a physical nature between the sexes. So far there is no disagreement. The problem arises when it is suggested that psychological differences may have the same origin through the hormonal expression of the different chromosomes. The main opposition has been from intersexual cases of boys mistakenly being brought up as girls and vice versa. But many of these cases have, on close examination, been found to support the idea that masculinity results from testosterone rather than cultural expectations. Not only does testosterone production have psychological effects throughout life, but it seems that about two months after conception, the genetically male fetus produces testosterone which influences the actual brain structure.

For example, there is the famous and often quoted case of the American male identical twins born in the early 1960s. One of the twins had his penis accidentally severed during circumcision at seven months. One year later, it was decided to alter him surgically into a girl, so his testes were removed and a vagina constructed, and he was brought up as a girl. It was thought that she then developed with a comfortable female identity. However, it was later found that she had severe psychological difficulty after puberty in adjusting to a female role. One case

proves nothing either way, of course, but this case had been much cited as dramatic proof of the conventional wisdom that nurture, not nature, was responsible for gender. It may well be, however, that in this case it was the difference in brain structure that produced the psychological difficulties (Diamond 1982).

There are also cases of families such as the Dominican one studied by Julianne Imperato-McGinley (in Durden-Smith and de Simone 1983). A genetic abnormality transmitted through seven generations has produced no less than thirty-seven cases of babies born and brought up as girls with a strong female identity who changed into boys, with penis, testicles, and strongly marked secondary sexual characteristics at puberty. These seem to have made the transition from female to male quite comfortably. Again, it seems highly likely that these children’s brains were primed in utero to be male, which found natural expression with the onrush of testosterone production at puberty when hidden testes descended and the clitoris grew into a penis.

If it is true that male and female brains show statistically significant differences, it is hard to argue that there are no fundamental psychological differences. Such brain differences have been shown convincingly in animals, both in rats and in primates, and while it is less easy to demonstrate, there is considerable evidence that this is also true for humans (Durden-Smith and de Simone 1983). These anatomical differences reside in the much greater thickness of the corpus callosum, the fibers connecting the two hemispheres, in the female. There is also a different distribution in the language centers in males and females, demonstrated by stimulation during neurosurgery. This was originally done not to establish sexual differences but to avoid damaging language skills. It was found, and confirmed by many different observers, that the language centers are more widely dispersed in women than in men, in whom there seems to be a greater specialization of functions between the two hemispheres. There is also evidence of front-back differentiation of brain structure so that in cross section, the caudal end of the corpus callosum is thicker in males than females, not only in adults but in the fetus. This difference is so striking that the sex can be determined with one hundred percent accuracy. A large number of papers, going into great detail, are focussed in seminal ones by Jeanette McGlone (in Durden-Smith and de Simone 1983).

In a series of influential papers, Pierre Flor-Henry has developed a theory which, although drawn from biological, i.e., neurological and biochemical sources, should be of interest to Jungians (particularly when considering the anima-possessed man) (1978, 1979). He believe
that the superiority in men in the coarse visual-motor skills (as compared with women's superiority in language skills) is associated with mood, with movement, and with sexual fulfillment. This combination is organized by the right hemisphere, and, in the male, it is only later that it comes under the control of the left (verbal). This would mean the left-sided hemisphere verbal control is more precarious than in women. This, he believes, is the reason for the much greater preponderance in men of aggressive sociopathy and deviant sexual acting-out. There seem to be exaggeratedly "right-sided" men who commit crimes that are practically unknown in women. It would certainly confirm Jung's idea that when males become dominated by their moody, they are under the possession of the anima.

The differences, which are considered in great detail in Durden-Smith and de Simone (1983) can be summarized as follows. Men seem to be more specialized than women; they are better at activities requiring not only greater muscular strength but greater visual-motor skills, such as locating objects in space; they are better at abstraction and mathematical ability. Women are not only better at mothering and nurturing but are more verbal; better at fine visual-motor skills, which make them not only better at needlework but also more sensitive in intimate relationships; they have been shown to be more responsive, for example, to changes in the expression of the human face and they speak differently in that they use much more nonverbal expressive gestures in conversation. Much of the differences observed can be attributed to the long evolutionary period in which men were hunters and women gatherers. This is far greater than the period in which agriculture developed, let alone the tiny period of industrial society. Even today, in spite of the numerous demonstrations of the different roles of men and women in different societies, which purport to show that culture is more important than nature, there are no known societies in which women hunt, although in a minority of cases, they assist men in hunting. There are no societies run by a group of women (even Mrs. Thatcher surrounds herself with men). Although there are patrilineal societies, there are not and probably never have been any truly matriarchal ones, and the Amazons exist only in myth (for a more detailed argument of this position, see Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox 1972).

No doubt there is some scope for the differences to change in the future, even the biological ones. Humankind is self-defining, and the differences are only statistical and do not therefore apply to all men and all women. But what I want to insist on here is that there are obstacles, limits, and constraints which have to be taken into consideration and that these are not simply due to prejudicial stereotyping but have a foundation in nature. Sex and gender should be distinguished but the distinction is not a crude or simple one. Furthermore, none of the differences I have mentioned should be thought of as inequalities or in any way justifying one gender dominating the other. They do help us to establish the ways in which men and women can be complementary to each other while retaining their respective autonomy and equality in the social power structure.

Part Two: Anima and Animus in Clinical Practice

Clinical Orientation

Jungian analysts do not all practice in the same way. The variations in technique are so great that the usefulness of Jungian concepts cannot easily be compared among practitioners unless full allowance is made for the conditions in which analysis is taking place as well as the aims and interests of the analyst. These factors will determine what it is that the analyst is looking for and is most likely to discern, indeed in what it is that the analyst will be regarding as the clinical "material." It seems to me to be most important that any hostility that one analyst has toward the orientation of another should be at least held in check by these considerations.

As I am a member of the London school, it will come as no surprise that I am interested in development, in infantile origins, in the details of personal history, in seeing patients four or five times a week, in the use of the couch, in psychoanalytic contributions, especially of the British object-relations approach, and consequently in the subtle vicissitudes of the transference and the countertransference. This does not mean that I am not a Jungian, and although I am deeply interested in religion, mythology, and alchemy, these are not in the forefront of my mind while I am with patients. They are, nevertheless, in the background and, at times, become very illuminating and then enter the forefront. I am sure that, conversely, other Jungians, who seem to be actively looking for impersonal archetypal material, must equally be struck, at times, by the emergence of personal historical factors and that most of the differences between rival schools can be seen as matters of relative emphasis.

In the last decade, in addition to intensive analysis, part of my own clinical work, having had a training in group analysis, has been with groups and also with couples seen conjointly and in couples groups. There seem to be a rapidly increasing number of Jungian ana-
lysts now extending their work to these areas. As others are finding, too, working with more than one person at a time, with a Jungian theoretical framework, opens up new questions about that framework. One begins to question not only the rather introverted bias of Jung's interests, which led to an overemphasis on inner—rather than outer-world phenomena, but also his great insistence on the individual, which colored his view of individuation. These considerations have gradually come to have a marked influence on my individual work, and although I have written more extensively elsewhere on this subject (Zinkin 1989), this paper will be more comprehensible if I summarize here some of the implications for the study of the manifestations of anima and animus in a clinical setting.

Inner and outer events were, at least in theory, given equal prominence by Jung in his great division between introversion and extraversion. In his diagrams of the psyche, used in his seminars, Jung arranged inner and outer hierarchically, although either the ego or the collective unconscious (or Self) might be at the top or bottom of the hierarchy. These diagrams can be studied in Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (1939).

Working with groups and couples, one has to pay special attention to a third area, the interpersonal, and one cannot but be struck by the fact that it is in this area that so much of psychic life is lived and psychological development takes place. One is further drawn to the view that the phenomena being observed are simply indescribable except in interpersonal terms. In the U.S.A., the great pioneer of this whole mode of thinking was Harry Stack Sullivan, and in Britain, a similar pioneer has been S. H. Foulkes who has developed the notion of group analysis based on the idea that "Man's social nature is an irreducible basic fact" (Foulkes 1964, p. 109).

A further influence has been infant research, which places a similar emphasis on the interpersonal and on intersubjectivity in the first social exchanges between the mother and her baby. This in turn has altered my notions of reductive analysis and reconstruction of infancy (Zinkin 1991).

Clinical work, by its very nature, demands of its practitioners that they distinguish between health and illness, normality and pathology, but although every therapist explicitly or implicitly has to make such distinctions, it is rare for them to be spelled out in a clinical presentation. In marital work, especially as one sees distressed couples, one is compelled to address questions like: "What is marriage?" "Is it a good idea?" "How should a man and woman try to live happily together?" "What roles should they play?" "What distribution of work and play should they try to agree on?" There is a tendency in our pluralistic age to say there are no rules and no universal answers to questions like these. Nevertheless, one is being addressed as a consultant who is expected to know what is healthy and therefore desirable and what is unhealthy and needs to change. Working with couples as a Jungian leads one to ask questions about anima and animus projections, one onto the other. But this means having to make judgments about what is contrasexual and split-off and what is contrasexual and integrated in each partner, and what each partner can reasonably expect in the way of change from the other. The problems raised are not easily solved. Working with my wife as a co-therapist, I find that we by no means always agree about these judgments, and we certainly find it difficult to get agreement with the two partners. What we work for is, of course, agreement between all four of us but even when we have achieved this quadrinho, this wholeness, who is to say that we have "got it right"? Nevertheless it is essential to have at least a provisional working model of healthy male/female relations.

In this paper, I have chosen to concentrate on individual analysis, which is still the main clinical model for analytical psychology, and in my two clinical examples, I will be trying to show how these questions are just as valid in the analytic dyad as in the treatment of couples. In both examples, there is a constant struggle to achieve agreement about what is male and what female, what is part and what whole, what is projected and what really belongs to the other. The struggle involves both partners in the analysis and is not just a question of the analyst analyzing his patient while processing his countertransference or "irrational" reactions to his patient.

I have chosen to present two very short extracts from long and intensive analyses from my clinical practice. It will be noticed that in both examples the analyst, being myself, is male and the patient female. This is quite deliberate. My view of females is necessarily limited by me being male, while the females' perception of me is similarly limited. The gender of the analyst has often been thought to be irrelevant in the long run because both male and female figures can so readily be projected onto the same analyst. I think that this common assertion, although it has some truth in it, overlooks some very real and important differences. I have many limitations as a therapist, and although I can go a long way to overcoming them, I can never be a female one and this has consequences for both my men and women patients. With men, we can only deal with our perceptions or fantasies...
about the absent women, while with women, neither of us can be sure that we understand each other in the way we would if our bodies did not have significant differences. What I do believe and hope to illustrate in my two examples is that anima and animus problems can be most fruitfully worked with where the genders are different and where both partners are faced with the gender barrier, uncrossable except in the imagination. If the genders are the same, fantasies about the opposite one can never be properly tested out, whereas a woman's fantasies about men can at least be subjected in the here-and-now to my own perceptions of myself, as can fantasies about women where a female therapist is working with a man.

Clinical Example 1: Anna

For my first example, I should like to describe the beginning of just one session. I opened the door of my consulting room to admit Anna. As I stood there, expecting her as usual to leave her coat on a nearby chair and walk silently to the couch without looking at me or speaking, in a ritual which has taken place a hundred times before, she surprised me by bending down to pick up a glove, saying, “Here's a glove” and then placing it on the piano which stands nearby. I said and did nothing and she went to the couch and lay down. As she reflected on what had just taken place, it emerged that she had not at all liked what had happened at the beginning and particularly was critical of herself and the way she had behaved on coming into the room. Reflecting on her entry and trying to understand her difficulty, I thought of an actress who has not made a good entrance onto the stage. I think of Stanislavsky, who might have said to an actress: “Go onto the stage. You will see a glove on the floor. Pick it up!” It is the kind of thing which sounds perfectly simple but is, in fact, a difficult exercise. Like an actress (and Anna, I knew, was very interested in acting), Anna was acutely aware of being observed and this contributed to her inability to act spontaneously. She was then faced with the problem of trying to reconstruct the action leading up to the scene she had to play and how it might have been quite different. She reported her thoughts as follows: when she saw the glove, she noticed that it was an old one and this gave her pleasure. She thought of running out and pursuing the previous patient, who had just left, and also of handing it to me, but this she could not do. Looking at me and handing the glove to me would have been a dangerous testing out of a fantasy. Our hands might have touched—and then? It was not difficult for me to imagine the possible sequels. I could now see that my idea of the actress performing in front of the great director was not quite accurate. The exercise would be even more difficult. She would find another actor on the stage, a man, but would be given no idea as to what her relationship with him was supposed to be. She could, for example, imagine they were lovers but she could not know whether the actor would have the same or a different idea of their relationship. In other words, her spontaneity could not exist except in a context provided by the other. To give meaning to their actions, the two actors would have to express a common understanding of what their past relationship had been.

Anna’s difficulty was that although a great deal of intimacy had been built up during the analysis, she could not at that moment rely on this and I had become (and indeed was acting) the formal analyst rather distantly recognizing a patient coming into a consulting room, thus perhaps this was the scene in which she was acting (or trying to). In this scene, she might have thought I had not remembered her and myself as having been any closer than we now seemed to be, or that even though I had remembered, I was not expecting her to have remembered. Or perhaps she remembered only after she had come in and then it was too late. On such occasions, it is tempting to ask the patient what has been going on in her mind but to ask is to show that one has already not understood and the exercise has failed.

This is the kind of incident which brings to my attention the archetypal background against which it occurs. The problem that emerged was that Anna had behaved in a dull, muted, mechanical way which was acutely painful to her because she longed to be remembered and to be recognized by someone she loved and who loved her. I am not calling this “transference,” which, strictly speaking, would suggest that such an expectation was based on an illusory or possibly delusional projection, although it undoubtedly had certain transference elements that might be analyzable. It would be truer to say that it was not her fantasy but her actual behavior which was an acting-out of transference. The fantasy was that she meant nothing at all to me. She was just another patient, possibly an interesting case, but certainly not one for whom I would have any special feeling. This was certainly not the reality. Her behavior then and for most of the ensuing session had a quality of lifelessness.

If one sees, as I do, the archetypal level as a backdrop to the relationship, then the operative myth is the one I find myself thinking about when trying to understand what is going on in the relationship. Usually I find that the myth which comes to mind is one that reflects
the genders of the patient and myself. I cannot easily be Demeter to Persephone but I can quite easily be Orpheus to Eurydice. In this particular instance, my archetypal backdrop was not one of the great world myths but a fairy tale, "The Little Mermaid." This came to my mind because she had once told me that this story had made her cry.

In this story, the little mermaid makes the mistake of falling in love with a drowning prince, and so, instead of drawing him down to his death, she saves his life and he returns to dry land. From then on, she wants to become human and to have a soul. Before she can go onto dry land herself, she needs legs (and presumably genitals, although these are politely not mentioned), and the condition imposed on her by the Sea Witch is that she has to have her tongue cut out. She willingly submits to this brutal mutilation. When on the land, she not only finds that her every step is agony but the prince does not recognize her and there is no way in which she can remind him who she is. Looking at it from the prince's point of view, which Hans Christian Andersen does not, one is reminded that it is often difficult to recognize someone in an unfamiliar context and in any case, she has made a dramatic change: she is no longer a mermaid, no longer at home in her environment. She is now a human but a mute and crippled one. Nevertheless he is drawn to her and she becomes his constant companion. When he later meets another girl, he wants to marry her because she reminds him of the one who rescued him. The little mermaid has to endure the agony of mutely witnessing this new relationship and thus cannot gain the soul she craves.

Part of Anna's agonizing dilemma when she entered my room was that she could not speak. She, of course, was not really mute, and indeed she was able to say a few words but she could not truly speak to me. She could not remind me of what she was. If she had to remind me, it meant that I had not remembered. It was as though what had really happened to her, or what she hoped had really happened to her, belonged to another existence, another realm. No action was possible unless I could remember who she was in this other realm. I was not giving any sign that I recognized her other than as my patient, who had arrived as she always did for yet another session of analysis. Like the little mermaid, she might also be expected to be jealous of the other woman but this would not be the primary problem, which was existential and concerned with more basic problems of identity, the nature of reality and fantasy, of change and the meanings of discontinuities in time and space, in socially constructed roles, in intimacy, and in forbidden love. As an analyst, it was difficult to know what might be in her mind at this moment and she, being mute, was relying on my ability to understand. So now I knew she could not know what I knew, and she, for all I knew, might think I was cruelly testing her or might, on the other hand, not realize she was not behaving perfectly normally. I should add, too, that she knew I had a visual defect which might have prevented me from seeing the glove until she had drawn my attention to it but she could not be sure that this was so. As when reading the story, one feels there should be a simple solution which would avert the tragedy. Surely, one thinks, the prince should have been able to recognize the little mermaid without her tail. Why could he not see with his own eyes this girl who loved him? Alas, in the story, he never does and there is no happy ending.

What is curious about the story is that a mermaid, an obvious anima figure, should want a soul. One might think that she is a soul and that what she needed was a body. Perhaps Andersen has made a mistake. I do not think so. One does not need to think so logically when making up a story, or rather, there might be a right-brained logic taking over from a left-brained one. This must be the case when an archetype appears in a story that seems to be about people. Mermaids are not exactly people. They may be half-people, or it may always be ambiguous, never clear whether they are or not. They do not usually fall in love themselves, and when the little mermaid does this, she begins a process of departing from her mermaid nature. Having fallen for a mortal man, at the point when his mortality is evident, she, too, has to become fully human if she wants to see him again. For this, she has to pay a terrible price. The loss of her tongue is not the loss of human speech but of her mermaid song, which, sirenlike, draws men to their deaths. As a watery underworld being, she might act as, or stand in for, the man's soul but she cannot herself have one. In fact, she has no real existence but is merely a fantasy figure for the man, who could then be said to have projected his anima or lost his soul. Once she loses her mermaid powers, she ceases to be the anima or soul but begins to have a real existence for herself. Then she experiences the pain of a lack that can only be made good by another, by the man she has saved. She has to face the ordeal that the man, who no longer needs saving, can exist without her, is no longer drawn to her, and cannot appreciate that, out of her love, she did not use her powers of attraction, which for him would have meant death. Later, she has a chance to kill him and save herself, but once again, she lets him go and even this he does not know.

The patient who gets the love of the analyst through seduction always knows that his love is not given freely but that he has fallen
captive to her powers of fascination and then can no longer function as an analyst even if he escapes the professional "death" of being struck off the register. She knows this only if she is no longer innocent, no longer without insight or consciousness of the power of sexual difference to elicit the projection of men's animas. Anna had considerable anima power but she could not use it. If the true business of analysis is what Hillman has called "soul-making," then a woman can only make soul for a man by not being his anima. If she is this, she loses her true self. She helps the man's soul-making only by retaining her true femininity, which men can appreciate when they are not projecting but perceiving truly.

I have put forth this explanation in a way that may seem odd. It might be objected that it is not necessary or desirable for a woman to make soul for a man. She only needs to do it for herself. But this disregards what I believe to be crucial. A man cannot know what it is to be a woman. He can imagine it but only because women exist. He cannot relate to a female part of himself other than by recognizing in himself what he imagines to be in a woman's consciousness of being a woman. If this is so, a woman cannot fulfill his longings for a soul by being an anima projection screen. This would only trick him and might destroy him. It is only through her own actual femininity that a woman can provide a man with a soul, and if she does so, she makes soul for herself in the relationship, because she, in her turn, cannot understand her feminine nature without the different nature of men. In the case of Anna, I have made the point that a fantasy was not what was wanted to make our relationship come alive. It was not that what was remembered was only a dream, something not "really" true, but that what was happening now was the dream, a bad one, in which reality had been forgotten. The reality could only find existence within our relationship. It is true that my task was the very difficult one of helping her to internalize the relationship that belonged uniquely to us, and by "internalise" I mean recall it and anticipate it in my absence. But what I do not mean is that there might be some independent possibility of her understanding this outside the context of our relationship, however much she might enjoy or resonate with myths, fairy tales, or alchemical texts.

In my analysis of Anna, it was important to work on her personal history, especially her very traumatic early childhood in which there were separations of which she could make no sense. The anima archetype, as portrayed by the little mermaid, is inseparable from this but does not itself deal with it. No amount of amplification could help her if her individual history was left out. But the story had a linking function. First, it placed the archetype in a setting where an individuation process is taking place as the mermaid becomes a real girl. Then the plight of the mermaid can be linked to the patient's actual childhood, and it can also be seen to be reenacted in the here-and-now of the analyst-anaclis relationship including its unconscious elements in both participants in the form of transference and countertransference. The archetype itself plays only a limited role in this process. From a therapeutic point of view, its significance was that it had not remained outside awareness but turned up as an image expressing what was missing in our relationship. If this is made good, it will disappear into the background again. The anima as "soul image" then disappears and soul takes its place.

In the light of these observations, the earlier theoretical problems can be readdressed. Sometimes the archetypal realm is given a more basic position, notably in "archetypal psychology." This viewpoint could lead to the suggestion that our notions of male and female are themselves derived from the archetypes. This would imply that the sense of mystery attached to them was derived from the essentially unknowableness of the archetypes and therefore can only be apprehended through images. Men and women might then be regarded as convenient pegs on which to hang the archetypal clothes, equally convenient pegs being the sun and moon or gold and silver or umbrellas and purses. Quite logically, Jung's notions of the contra-sexuality of the anima and animus then have to be discarded.

Such a view can easily be derived from a particular way of working. If the analyst is seen purely as one accompanying the patient on the journey of individuation, if the patient, for example, has been having dreams indicating that a coniunctio is taking place, with the analyst drawing the patient's attention to alchemical or mythical parallels to the dream material, it is perfectly possible to conclude that the patient has both an anima and an animus because both appear in the dream. Not only the sex of the patient but also that of the analyst would be immaterial. This might easily seem to be the case where the analyst is following Jung's procedure of minimizing the transference through infrequent sessions in the face-to-face position. On the other hand, the same claim is made by some analysts who work with the transference all the time and see all the material in terms of projections onto the analyst. These analysts claim that the actual sex of the analyst makes no difference because, in the long run, the patient's fantasies may take a male or female form. If the focus is neither on the psyche and the collective unconscious nor on the transference as the intrapsychic pecu-
liarity of the patient but on the interaction seen as the joint production of the participants, then the gender of the participants (as well as other unalterable facts about them) play an all-important part.

In my clinical example, which cannot be separated from the way I work, it is evident that the nature of the experience that Anna and I had together would not have been the same if I had been a woman or she a man. It is true that a homosexual attraction would have seemed similar in some ways. But imagining homosexual intercourse would have introduced many factors not present in the heterosexual relationship and these would have completely altered the tone of the encounter. In my imagined exercise, Stanislavsky would have had to ask a man to pick up the glove or if he had asked a woman the other person on the stage would have had to be a woman. It is not difficult to see that the resulting performance would not be the same. It might still be argued that the differences would reflect only the social or personal reality but not the archetypal or transpersonal level. There seems no end to this form of argument, which would include the idea that the archetypes are, by definition, quite impersonal and that it is only we who personify them or that they can only appear to us in the guise of persons. Although these arguments are often used by Jung himself, they do not do justice to my own clinical experience. Social or personal reality is not, for me, a lower-level distortion, through archetypal projection, of a purer, higher but essentially unknowable impersonal truth; on the contrary, it seems to me that impersonal abstract patterns often referred to as archetypes are the distortions of the living relationships in which the true archetypes have their existence. The emergence of the mermaid, in my example, is not of an archetypal image transcending my actual feeling for Anna. In spite of its universality and numinous qualities, the image is a partially impersonal distortion of men’s perceptions of women. Although called a “soul image,” it is a false one. A true soul can be acquired only if the mermaid sheds her tail and changes her habitat.

What I have said here applies also to the other archetypes. There can be no child archetype without children, no trickster without tricksters, no senex without old men. The archetype is a backdrop that universalizes our experience of the particular and thus deepens our experience. But there is no substitute for relationships with others which put the archetypes into perspective. My view is that there is a social reality not solely determined by the archetypes, that it is largely constructed by people in relationship does not make it less real. It is at a different level from the reality of the archetypes, and while they enrich it, it also enriches them.

Jung’s personal history, particularly as related in Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1963), tends to give the misleading impression that he was able to individuate in isolation from others, particularly because of his social isolation as an intelligent but withdrawn country boy, with his depressed father, his remote, “medieval” mother, and his sister, who is hardly mentioned. I think it is true that these early experiences, leading to a split between his number one and number two personalities, were mostly in existence in his private, inner world but that what saved him was his development as a public figure in his outer world experiences, in that he met others in the wider world who shared his experiences, so that he could develop them as part of a generalized psychology. These other real people were often remote figures in time and space, although it is important not to underestimate the presence of the actual women in his life, particularly his wife, Emma.

Although Jung was very interested in psychic reality, he still needed to understand it in relation to everyday reality. It would not have been possible for Jung to achieve individuation through his dreams and visions until he had discovered others who had similar ones. In “The Psychology of the Transference,” Jung diagrammatically represents the situation where there is both anima and animus (1946, par. 422). The relationship of the adept to the soror mystica (his female helper) is used as the analogue of the transference. “Now the adept,” says Jung, “is conscious of himself as a man, consequently his masculinity cannot be projected, since this only happens to unconscious contents” (1946, par. 421). He says this in a passage where he is discussing the possibility that the male figure of the King (in the second picture of the Rosarium) represents the anima and the Queen is the animus. If the coniunctio represents the transference-countertransference relationship as Jung suggests, then he is taking the Rosarium pictures as representing the unconscious relationship between the analyst and patient, assuming that one is conscious of himself as being male and the other of herself as female, e.g., where the doctor is male like the adept and the patient female like the soror. Only in this way can his diagram, where the anima of one relates to the animus of the other, fit the analytic situation. What happens in the frequent cases where the analyst and analysand are of the same sex is not clear in this account. Despite the title, “The Psychology of the Transference,” Jung is not primarily concerned in this essay with describing the intricacies of the transference as illustrated with actual patients, only with the intricacies of the alchemical series, which for him illustrate the complexity of the
unconscious relationship of the analytic dyad. What the reader makes of the analogy depends on his or her own clinical experience. Nevertheless, it provides a background for what Schwartz-Salant calls the “interactive field” in which in addition to the couple of persons in the room, there is also the unconscious couple (1989). For me, this notion of the interactive field enables us to describe phenomena that exist only as the result of the interaction of two or more people.

There is therefore an intermingling of individual psyches, each of which is unable to individuate without the other, and the archetypal figures that arise do so not within the individual, nor wholly outside, but within the relationship they have with each other. I do not, like Winnicott (1971), regard this as a transitional area, but an area on a higher level of reality than that of the single individual. In the early parent-child interaction, I believe that the two-person experience is the primary reality for the child, taking place in the patterns of the synchronized nonverbal exchanges between the two participants (Stern 1983). These take the form of certain universally found communication patterns, equivalent to “the patterns that connect,” to use Gregory Bateson’s phrase (1979). These may well be the earliest manifestations of the archetypes. I think it would be quite possible to use the Rosarium pictures for illustrating what goes on in the mother-infant dyad in the same way that Jung does for the transference, and it is significant that Jung never regarded the transference as unique to the analytic situation. This leads me to a conclusion quite different from Jung’s: that the analytic situation provides the ideal setting in which the mother-infant relationship can be relived, and so deliberately cultivate and explore the transference-countertransference interaction in my clinical work because I consider this early interaction influential to all subsequent relationships. While it is not my special aim to demonstrate the clinical value of this way of working in this paper, I do want to reiterate the point that the anima and animus as a pair of archetypes do not have their existence in the individual psyche but that they come to life in the dyad, the interactive field formed by a group of two.

Clinical Example 2: Felicity

My second example is another female patient, Felicity. In this case, I will focus not on my anima as elicited by her for me but on her animus as elicited by me for her. In this case, the animus was not only projected onto me but also experienced by her as a part of herself.

Felicity was very enthusiastic about her analysis with me. Her enthusiasm was so great that she created misgivings in me as to whether I could fulfill her expectations of it. She came from a great distance for her sessions, and the long journeys there and back were filled with thoughts of the analysis and with her endeavors to understand her own inner world. She recorded her dreams in great detail and had done so for herself long before she began analysis with me. The sheer volume and richness of the material, whether it was dreams, fantasies, thoughts about her family or her work, or memories of childhood, often made it difficult for her to talk without providing an endless commentary on what she was saying. For instance, if she brought a dream, she also had to provide all the meanings it already had for her and all the associations that had occurred to her, before and during the telling of it. As this might go on for a long time before I actually knew what the dream was, let alone felt ready to interpret it, and because while she was doing all this, she was also having more thoughts, fantasies, and memories which made her want not to talk about the dream at all, it was often a long time before I said anything at all. It was not as chaotic as it might sound, and I did not usually feel swamped, nor did I feel a strong desire to talk myself. She was coherent and articulate, and I was interested in what she was saying and not in a hurry to intervene. She, on the other hand, did not feel the same. She got fed up with having so much to say, so much to comment on, and with not being able to say something simply and spontaneously and then see how I responded. At times, she would become exasperated and say something like: “Oh, shut up, Felicity!” Curiously, she regarded this talker and commenter, including her critical efforts to shut herself up, as a masculine part of herself and by contrast could see the feminine part as a shape, which she outlined with her hands as being like a single vertical eye, which she said was looking both inward and outward. My own contribution was to say that the shape she described seemed like a vulva and she instantly agreed. This led to reflections on the vulva being an opening to an interior self as well as to the outside world. She then reported the following dream, which had two parts:

Dream: She wanted to have a holiday by herself and rented a cottage in a very beautiful part of the countryside. But when she got to the cottage, she found that there was a man already there. He was down-at-heel and “slobbery” and she did not much care for his appearance. He claimed that he, too, had booked the cottage. Although she did not welcome his presence, she agreed to let him stay there, too.
In the second part she was again in a holiday cottage. This time she was inside and was sharing it with two other girls. They had all just arrived, were unpacking, and the atmosphere was one of "girlish fun." They were being giggly and light-hearted. Then a man, whom she immediately recognized as the man in the first part of the dream, arrived at the door. He demanded entry, once again claiming a double booking. But she was not going to be fooled a second time and indignantly refused, whereas he begged and pleaded to be allowed to stay, assuring her that he would be no trouble. The other two girls were quite amused and said: "Let him stay." But she got very angry and said: "Either he goes or I go!" The dream ended and she had no idea what the outcome was.

The man was undoubtedly an animus figure. He could also be regarded as the shadow but what was striking was his maleness, although not in an attractive or exciting form. The situation is reminiscent of certain fairy tales, such as "Beauty and the Beast" or "The Frog Prince," in that she was required to accept his presence, although in the dream this was not in return for any help he had given. Also, he had tricksterlike qualities, although this became apparent only in the second part, when she could see through his crudely attempted deception. But he is still mainly the animus.

In discussion, the dream was closely associated with the previous material on the vulva as an entrance to her private interior space and with the memory of an older man who had romped with her when she was about thirteen. She thought she could remember feeling his erect penis but she could certainly remember her mother coming in, angry at what was going on.

In another session soon after this, going over the same material, she found herself wanting to stay after the end of the session. She wanted to ask me if she could stay for another session even though she knew that I had another patient to see then. She became quite upset at her difficulty in actually asking me this, and she both let me know what the question was and explained at the same time that I must not answer. As the session neared its end and she went on being upset, I gently said that of course I could understand her need to stay. Although I did not answer the question itself (and in any case she already knew the answer), I did not hurry her out but waited till she had recovered herself sufficiently to be able to leave. I did not know how long this would take but she got up to go only a few minutes over the ending time.

Although there is a great deal in this material which could be discussed, what was very striking was how her behavior, following the dream, repeated the idea of the double booking. This time it was she who was wanting to stay, even though she knew she could not claim the right to do so. It happened because she had to stay in London for an evening event and had nothing to do and nowhere to go in the meantime. Her regressed self, which could not bear to leave and could not bear the thought of her place being taken by another, was being expressed, not by being a seductive anima figure but by a male part of herself which she did not act out but which she could nevertheless communicate to me.

In her experience of herself, the masculine part of Felicity was much larger than her femininity. She came across to me as quite a feminine personality, albeit with certain masculine traits, but her own experience of herself was of the little eye (?) that could be quite overwhelmed by the masculine part or animus which didn't stop talking and arguing. It was only gradually that she could acknowledge the power of the eye either to refuse or to grant admission to her inner chamber, as she is able to do in the second part of her dream, and to recognize it therefore as private (analogic, female) rather than secret or forbidden (digital, male).

In a later session, the penultimate one before a holiday break, Felicity talked about how contented she felt lying on the couch, knowing I was sitting so close that it would be possible to reach out with hand and touch me. It felt safe and peaceful. I asked her whether she now felt that she had let me in. Her response was to feel surprised that she should ask such a question. Surely I knew. She was not only surprised when she was upset and no longer felt safe. This reaction made me feel that she had made an insensitive mistake in asking her the question.

In the next session, the last before the break, she said she had quickly felt all right again after leaving the day before. This happened because she was able to recall what it had felt like being safe with me and knowing she was going to come again the next day. But in the course of the session, it happened again. She was saying that lying on the couch felt like lying in my arms. I said, "That sounds like mother arms." Then, thinking this didn't seem quite right, I added, "Is it mother or perhaps a lover?" She tried to think about my question and said "a lover," but I went on to reflect that this would be exciting rather than restful and she said that talking about it was exciting but perhaps it had been more like the way one feels after making love. She immediately had some critical thoughts about this idea by realizing that sh
had not had an experience like having sex. As she tried to deal with these thoughts, her mind became active in a way that reminded her of her mother who talked endlessly, "yakking away." This talk got in the way of any genuine communication with her mother. "She just doesn't relate to you," she said. She recognized that the way she herself talked often had this same quality of "yak yak yak," which got in the way, not only of relating to me but of relating to herself. Not only did it go into a great deal of detail but it had a note of hostile criticism in it. This again seemed to her to be a distinctly masculine part of herself. The feminine part had no voice, or perhaps it had a very soft voice that got completely drowned by the masculine talk. It is easy to recognize in Felicity's self-description the animus, which is not truly masculine but corresponds to her image of masculinity when it manifests itself both in her mother and in herself. It could be said that what she thought of as masculine was a stereotypically distorted version of assertiveness which she associated with men, expressing her opinions in a female imitation of the way men talk. One of the analytic tasks would be to integrate both talking and asserting herself with her shy and quiet femininity, which not only did not want to talk or ask questions but did not want me to either. Talk concealed another kind of speech associated with "relating" and with intimacy.

Although my account of the animus, based on my patient's insights, is not quite the same as Jung's description of the opinionated animus-ridden woman, it is still very close to it. The need for another kind of speech associated with femininity is experienced as a need for silence or an inability to speak, very similar to what Anna had experienced. My own view is that it is not really silence as such that is required, only the silencing of the alienating talking. Silence may be a failure to communicate. Although it is impossible not to communicate at all, the message sent in silence may not be received or may be received as a false message. *King Lear* provides a wonderful example of what I mean. "Nothing will come of nothing: speak again," says King Lear to the silent Cordelia at the beginning of the play, a "nothing" which is echoed again and again in the play. At the end, in the moving reconciliation scene (V.3), Lear, expecting to end his days in prison with his daughter, says:

> And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh
> At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues
> Talk of court news; and we'll talk with them too

Who loses and who wins; who's in, who's out;
And take upon's the mystery of things,
As if we were God's spies....

Lear now understands something he had no conception of at the beginning of the play, when he wanted speeches from his daughters. He understands now the value of a different kind of talk, seemingly mere gossip, but whose content has little importance while it eloquently expresses *relationship*. Words are used but the exchange is nonverbal. This is similar to the "exchange of sweet nothings" between lovers but again, I think it derives originally from the first exchanges between mother and baby. It is this maternal behavior which, I believe, is responsible for the association of eros and of relationship with femininity. It is a gentle voice not really requiring words, and it may take the form of singing (a right-brain activity which can remain intact after a stroke when the left-brained speech center is destroyed). The mermaid's song "each to each" and it is the sirens' song which can distract the sailors to their death.

The conversation, using words but also expressing the relationship, that Felicity sought with me was a combination of male and female corresponding to logos and eros, based on actual rather than metaphorical male-female differences.

Conclusions

There has never been a time when our notions of male and female have been more often in the melting pot and, because of the way Jung has set out his ideas of the anima and animus, this has thrown the Jungian world into some disarray. It is now possible to discern a wide variety of conflicting views on the anima and the animus. In this spectrum of views, my own has tended to support the idea that we should retain both terms of Jung's concept, namely that they are (1) *contrasexual* (2) *archetypes*. On the other hand, because of the great plasticity of the human psyche, our ability to define and redefine ourselves, a great deal of modification takes place in the culture, especially as mediated by the mother in the early months of life. It is this plasticity that gives rise to gender-confusion and to homosexuality seen in the clinical situation and supports the idea that everyone has both an anima and animus. What has concerned me here has been the limitations of this plasticity. We can redefine ourselves in the imagination or we can see about becoming what we have imagined. Having periods or having baby or having an erection is not the same as imagining what it feel
like to have them. For both men and women, and thus for every individual, there is always a lack, which requires relationship, and my main clinical emphasis has been on the achievement of agreement or consensus between analyst and analysand on how they are relating to each other, without any certainty that by doing so, they are reaching any final conclusion about absolute truth. In turn, this means placing more emphasis than usual on interpersonal rather than intrapsychic happenings.

Working with couples and with groups has also helped me to be aware of certain limitations in dyadic analysis, particularly in working with the animus and anima. I referred earlier to the limitations of gender but would like here to make one further observation. It concerns the well-recognized problem of the deleterious effect analysis may have on the patient's partner. This is usually attributed to the difficulty she or he has in coping with the progressive effects of the analysis. This cannot be the only explanation and I am not satisfied, either, that separate analysis for the partner is the answer. If we believe that our patients are reaching greater maturity but that unfortunately this is leading to the breakdown of their marriages, there may be something wrong with our theories and our values. If we believe that seeing the partner will spoil the analysis, there may be something wrong with our notion of preserving the analysis. If we do see the partner, there are certainly technical difficulties but the outcome for the continuing analysis can be profoundly richer.

My plea throughout has been for holding onto Jung's assumption that male and female psychologies are in a nontrivial sense different and that these differences are not reducible to culture but have deeper, ultimately biological roots. Acknowledging these fundamental differences does not, however, mean holding onto Jung's own rather dated descriptions, which do now seem to have a cultural bias.

This means that each individual has to acknowledge a permanent lack of whatever is characteristic of the opposite gender. Analysts play an important part in helping men and women to live happily with each other, and this means each gender group has to acknowledge a psychological lack which they can find only in the other. This standpoint, as I hope to have demonstrated, makes a difference to the clinical handling of the anima and animus.

This brings me to a more general conclusion that goes beyond gender issues and which I can set out only tentatively here. Because we live in social interaction with others, we do not have to look solely within ourselves to attain the sense of completeness, which Jung saw as the goal of individuation. Although Jung recognized this by distinguishing the extravert from the introvert ways of individuating, he did give the overwhelming impression of the priority of the inner to the outer world. In my emphasis on relationships with others, I have tried to avoid the dichotomy between inner and outer events because each person is relating outwardly to the inner world of the other as well as to his or her outer reality. This consideration does not apply only to male and female questions but is most easily grasped in this area. Even if it is true that we all have some degree of bisexuality, a woman can never fully "realize" her maleness in the way a man can by being a man. But she can live happily with men (not necessarily literally living with one, although this helps, but living in enjoyable relations with them) and she can realize her maleness in another way because her imaginatively capacity to know what being a man feels like is necessary for the relationship. Needless to say, the converse applies for men. The human being is above all not only a social but an imaginative being and despite our seemingly infinite capacity to redefine ourselves, it is through our imagination, our ability to imagine what it is like to be the other and to be part of the relationship with the other, that we attain the sense of being more than we are. In this way, our very limitations are also our strength.

Afterthoughts

This is not meant to be another paper, but I would like to use this opportunity not just to repeat what I said before but to try to put things more clearly now that I know what everybody else at the Ghost Ranch conference is saying about a topic which we are all finding to be brimming with difficulties.

My main preoccupation has been: how much can we tinker with what Jung wrote? We don't know what he would be saying if he were alive and could be here today; we only know what he did say. We are not short of texts but they were composed at different times and for different audiences over a long lifetime. Do we consider, as the guide to his thought, his more carefully thought-out Collected Works his Red Book which was meant to be private, or his seminars, which are so lively and spontaneous but were certainly not meant to be studied by scholars more than half a century later pondering over his every word.

There seem now to be two main camps. One holds that men have an anima and women an animus. That is what Jung said. The other, perhaps more, holds that both sexes have both, or that the
paper and did originally say, but either my unconscious or my word processor saw to it that it got left out. That is that I don't think we are in the business of training mystics, and although there is a mystical approach which brings together and transcends all these problems, it is not one which many patients can adopt. I think Jung was a mystic, however much he disclaimed it. I am not one, although I have always been deeply interested in mysticism. I think this means that I do not look for completeness as the goal in quite the same way as Jung did. I rely for a sense of completeness more on the realization that each individual is permanently incomplete but can nevertheless enjoy his or her partness.

A man will always be a man and never a woman. His womanly side can best be realized not only by developing his feminality, but by enjoying and living as fully as possible with women, and this applies also vice versa to women. The anima as a female part of a man is a male image which may or may not be a distorted image of what is embodied in a woman. In the clinical situation of analysis, the aim is to see that the image can change from a distorted to a true image of what the Other actually is. It remains a restricted and limited point of view but is no longer a false one. I therefore think it should still be possible to say with Maurice Chevalier, although not with the same sexist bias with which he said it: "Vive la difference!" I hope it will be understood that I am taking not a sexist but an interpersonal view.

References